BY KENNEDY BAGLEY-FORTNER ‘26
STAFF WRITER
On Oct. 31st, Gloria Xiong ’17 returned to Mount Holyoke College to present her research on China’s coercive statesmanship. During her time at Mount Holyoke College, Xiong majored in politics and later received a Ph.D. in government from Cornell University in 2024.
Xiong “studies economic statecraft, sanctions, and domestic politics of international relations, with a focus on China.” Currently, she is an assistant professor in the Government Department at Colby College, and she is working on her book project which “investigates the drivers and consequences of China’s coercive statecraft.”
In an email interview with Mount Holyoke News, Xiong emphasised the personal significance of coming back to the College to present her research on China’s economic statecraft. Xiong wrote, “The opportunity to present my research as an alum is particularly meaningful because the research itself was catalyzed by the transformative teaching at Mount Holyoke [College].”
She also touched upon the importance of others learning about China’s coercion policies, “because of the globalized economy, we may all be under the potential influence of China’s economic statecraft. It is, therefore, important to understand the strategy and rationale behind such weaponization of economic interdependence.”
Xiong began by discussing how and why China’s political pressure tactics work. Her first example of China’s reliance on pressure tactics was within a domain not typically associated with international politics: The National Basketball Association.
“The NBA’s popularity in China exploded after Yao Ming was drafted by the Houston Rockets as the No. 1 pick in 2002 … nearly 500 million people, more than a third of China’s population, were tuning in to watch the league’s content,” according to CNN Sports.
Xiong writes, “In 2019, when the then-general manager of the Houston Rockets sent a [post on the social platform X] that voiced support for protests in Hong Kong, the Chinese government swiftly orchestrated a series of economic decisions in backlash against the NBA.”
While the then-general manager Daryl Morey hadn’t been posting in an official capacity in affiliation with the NBA, it “set off a firestorm in China,” reported Eurasia Group. This started an uproar between China and the NBA. Morey had to take down the post on X, and the NBA issued apologies on his behalf.
“Various state-owned and private streaming services suspended all NBA broadcasts, while sponsors and business partners withdrew millions of dollars in deals.” Xiong stated.
CNBC reported that NBA Commissioner Adam Silver “admitted the NBA suffered ‘substantial’ losses as the rift intensified. ”For the past six years, the NBA almost ceased to exist in China, a huge economic loss for the company.
When, according to an article by the NBA, “for the first time since 2019, NBA preseason basketball returned to China with the 2025 NBA China games,” it was clear that China’s pressure tactic worked.
With this in mind, Xiong smoothly transitioned to her main focus: economic coercion. Economic coercion can take many forms, however the Stimson Center summarizes it as “attempts to weaponize economic dependencies by forcing the target state(s) to comply and conform.”
Economic coercion “differs” from traditional trade policy measures “in that the coercive measures are often extralegal and target a political outcome that may not have a direct relationship to policy.”
For example, in 2022 , China suspended trade with Lithuania, after a Taiwanese representative office in Lithuania used the word “Taiwanese” instead of China’s preferred term “Taipei,” said the Brookings Institute.
China uses the word “Taipei” instead of “Taiwan” to proclaim their “One China” principle. By using Taiwan instead of Taipei, the representative office broke with China’s official preferences.
This is a great example of China’s reliance on economic coercion to combat “perceived challenges to Chinese territorial sovereignty, national and economic security, and domestic political legitimacy,” Xiong wrote.
Xiong also highlighted how China’s coercive tactics can have various outcomes. She emphasized how public opinion of both civilians and the local government can impact the retaliation from other countries. Take, for example, differences in public opinion between South Korea and Australia, who faced similar pressure from China on different issues.
The South Korean issue began in 2016 when the U.S. and South Korea announced a plan to install a mobile anti-ballistic missile system, known as THAAD. While the official purpose of THAAD was to defend South Korea against North Korean ballistic missiles, China opposed this defense system citing “concerns about the system’s potential impact on Chinese national security,” CSIS reported.
Regarding THAAD, "Conservatives and progressives were divided on how to handle the issue…conservatives argued that THAAD is a necessary deterrent against North Korea and China had no place opposing it,” according to the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. On the other hand, progressives “raised the concern that THAAD only benefits the US’s strategic interests and somewhat serves to stoke tensions with China and Russia.”
In retaliation, Beijing “launched a concerted economic campaign against South Korea,” stated Lawfare. This campaign targeted the multinational corporation Lotte Group, the owners of the land that would house the defense system.
Rather than explicitly punishing the Lotte Group “on the mainland, Beijing shut 74 of Lotte Mart’s 99 outlets, citing fire violations,” according to an article by Forbes. These “fire violations” are part of Chinese efforts to use their quiet coercion policies to achieve their goals. The total losses for 2017 were estimated at $1.7 billion, Lawfare reported. Additionally, China started to crack down on tourism to South Korea.
Relations were only stabilized after South Korea’s announcement of the “Three Nos”: “No additional THAAD deployment, no participation in the U.S. missile defense network, and no trilateral alliance with the United States and Japan,” according to the CSIS report.
Essentially, the South Korean government coalesced to China’s demands due to increasing economic pressure and public backlash.
Conversely, in 2017, the Australian parliament brought up legislation to “combat foreign interference in Australian politics,” CSIS reported. Malcolm Turnbull said that his proposed reforms “[were] not about any one country,” in an address reported by CNBC, but the Chinese government took the legislation as an attack.
Beijing “responded with a diplomatic freeze, along with reported trade restrictions against Australian beef and wine,” according to CSIS.
Following this, from 2018 to 2020, “Austrialia-China relations deteriorated further,” CSIS reported. This deterioration of relations put strain on both economies.
Xiong discussed how in 2020, the Chinese Embassy in Canberra leaked “China’s 14 Grievances.” The grievances ranged from a Huawei ban, visa cancellations, counter foreign interference legislation to the cancellation of the Belt and Road Initiative under the Foreign Arrangements Bill, in a declassified report from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
While the diplomatic freeze ended in November of 2022, trade tensions still remain.
In her lecture, Xiong provided these two examples which highlight the variety of outcomes. According to her, in the case of South Korea it resulted in a “tactical compromise,” whereas with Australia it resulted in “tactical resistance.”
Xiong’s research of China’s economic coercion is highly relevant in today’s globalized world. According to Xiong, the Chinese government moves stealthily, swiftly, and powerfully.
Sophie Francis ’28 contributed fact-checking.
